> How do we not have freelance bioweapons developers? Would it be any more difficult to prohibit the development and auctioning of cyberweapons?
First of all, we do, in the Middle East. But bioweaponry development is orders of magnitude more difficult: when you accidentally release your bioweapon into your own shed you die and it may be detected from abroad, when you accidentally release your cyberweapon into your own LAN you reimage machines and no one from outside noticed unless you're incredibly stupid.
Likewise, bioweaponry distribution is orders of magnitude more difficult, if you don't maintain the bioweapon properly the weapon doesn't work, if you don't climate control properly the weapon doesn't work, if you don't weaponize and launch it properly the weapon doesn't work. Cyberweapons can be copied around on cards no bigger than my thumbnail, and maintain practically forever.
These problems go on and on. You're literally talking about controlling information and communications. NSA has enough trouble trying to read communications (and we're all working as hard as we can to close that ability), let alone to have government control that flow of communications.
Your take on this is colored by the assumption that the US has a permanent lead in all these types of weapons. Aspects of handling bio-weapons can be more capital equipment intensive than making cyber-weapons, but I bet it cost tens of millions in hardware to test Stuxnet, where testing a bioweapon could be very cheap. Virus particles and bacteria can be very durable in plain glass vials and can be "shelf stable." At first-tier player level, I doubt the costs differ by orders of magnitude.
First of all, we do, in the Middle East. But bioweaponry development is orders of magnitude more difficult: when you accidentally release your bioweapon into your own shed you die and it may be detected from abroad, when you accidentally release your cyberweapon into your own LAN you reimage machines and no one from outside noticed unless you're incredibly stupid.
Likewise, bioweaponry distribution is orders of magnitude more difficult, if you don't maintain the bioweapon properly the weapon doesn't work, if you don't climate control properly the weapon doesn't work, if you don't weaponize and launch it properly the weapon doesn't work. Cyberweapons can be copied around on cards no bigger than my thumbnail, and maintain practically forever.
These problems go on and on. You're literally talking about controlling information and communications. NSA has enough trouble trying to read communications (and we're all working as hard as we can to close that ability), let alone to have government control that flow of communications.